Secure Polar Coding with Delayed Wiretapping Information by Zhao, Yizhi & Chi, Hongmei
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 1
Strong Security Polar Coding with Delayed
Wiretap Channel State Information
Yizhi Zhao, Member, IEEE, and Hongmei Chi
Abstract
Secure and reliable communication over the wiretap channel of delayed channel state information
(CSI) is an important realistic subject for the study of physical layer secure coding. In this paper a
communication model of this delay CSI assumption is presented on the basis of a simplified symmetric
compound wiretap channel. Then on this delay CSI communication model, a secure scheme of polar
coding based one time pad chaining structure is proposed which successfully achieves the weak security
and reliability for the degraded wiretap channel cases but fails to achieve either weak or strong security
for the non-degraded cases, due to the unidentifiable problem of the neither secure nor reliable polarized
subset. To solve this remaining problem of achieving the strong security in non-degraded delay CSI
cases, a new solution call modified multi-block chaining structure is presented in which the original
subset of frozen bit is constructed for conveying functional random bits securely. Finally by combining
this modified multi-block chaining structure with the one time pad chaining structure, an explicit strong
security polar coding scheme is proposed which has almost achieved the average secrecy capacity of
perfect CSI assumption under the delay CSI assumption with both reliability and strong security.
Index Terms
polar codes, channel state information, wiretap channel, strong security, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of achieving the secrecy capacity of wiretap channel (WTC) has always been an open
problem for physical layer secure communication [1]. In the last decade, after the invention of
Y. Zhao was with the College of Informatics, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan, Hubei, China. E-mail:
zhaoyz@mail.hzau.edu.cn.
H. Chi was with the College of Science, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan, Hubei, China. E-mail: chihong-
mei@mail.hzau.edu.cn.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
11
27
1v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
9 D
ec
 20
18
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 2
polar code [2], secure polar coding schemes had successfully achieved the secrecy capacities of
Wyner’s wiretap channel [3], [4] and several extended wiretap channel models [5]–[11]. All these
notable capacity achieving studies have in common that they are under the idealized assumption
of perfect channel state information (CSI) in which channel realization is fixed and known by
the legitimate parties during the entire communication process.
However, in practical communication this perfect CSI assumption can barely hold since there
are always uncertainties for CSI [13]. For instance, legitimate parties may unable to accurately
estimate the channel condition due to the limitation of physical environment; besides it cannot
be ensure that the information of eavesdropper’s adversarial behavior is instantly known by the
legitimate parties. Relevant to these practical situation, realistic uncertain CSI assumptions are
proposed, such as the compound wiretap channel [14] and arbitrarily varying wiretap channel
[15] in which the actual CSI is assumed unknown and varying within a known set of uncertain
CSI. Existing studies have already presented the characterization of secrecy capacities under
these uncertain CSI assumptions [16], [17], but how to achieve these capacities are still open
problems.
On the bright side of practical situation, although legitimate parties may not know the actual
CSI instantly, they can manage to obtain it with hindsight. This sort of delay CSI case has
been studied in [18] that the varying state is sent back to the legitimate transmitter by the
legitimate receiver through a feedback channel after some time delay. Also, another supportive
study is proposed in [19] that practically legitimate parties can detect the physical effect in the
environment coursed by the varying of CSI and then learn the CSI from the detected information
with high probability. Therefore as a step in solving the secrecy capacity achieving problem of
the uncertain CSI assumption, we begin with presenting the notion of a realistic delay CSI
assumption and exploring the explicit secure coding solution for this delay CSI case.
Specifically, we build the communication model of delay CSI assumption on a simplified
compound wiretap channel [13]. In this model, the main channel for legitimate block commu-
nication is known and fixed, but the realization of wiretap channel for eavesdropper is unknown
and varying over each blocks. Also we assume that
• Main channel and all the possible wiretap channel states are symmetric discrete memoryless
channels but with no necessarily degraded relations;
• Legitimate parties know all the possible states of wiretap channel;
• The state of wiretap channel remains constant during each blocks;
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• Legitimate parties can accurately obtain the wiretap channel state information only after
each block communication (the delay CSI case).
Note that in the delay CSI model, reliability of communication can be achieved by the physical
layer coding since the main channel condition is known and fixed. But the achieving of security
is much hard due to the uncertainty of wiretapping CSI. Even though the CSI can be obtained
after each block transmission, the precise channel state is still absent at the time of secure
encoding.
One possible solution for this delay CSI case is the one time pad (OTP) chaining method
proposed in [19] which coincidentally has a similar index partition structure as the basic secure
polar coding scheme in [3]. However after combining the chaining encryption method and
the basic secure polar coding together, we have found that under the reliability criterion the
constructed polar coding based OTP chaining structure can only achieve the weak security in
the degraded delay CSI cases, but fails to achieve neither weak security nor strong security in the
non-degraded delay CSI cases. For strong security polar coding, the mostly adapted technique
is the multi-block chaining structure proposed in [4]. The basic idea of this technique is to setup
a reliable and secure pre-transmitting for the bits of the unreliable and insecure subset of each
channel blocks. Unfortunately this technique cannot be directly applied to the delay CSI case
since the unreliable and insecure subset is unidentifiable without the CSI realization.
Therefore, for the strong security coding problem of delay CSI assumption, we present a new
modified multi-block chaining structure and combing it with the polar coding based OTP chaining
structure. Analysis results indicate that the proposed strong security polar coding scheme can
achieve both reliability and strong security. Also it has been proven that the secrecy capacity of
perfect CSI assumption can be almost achieved under the delay CSI assumption by our proposed
secure coding scheme.
The outline of this paper is as follow. Section II presents the notations and then introduces
the communication model of delay CSI assumption. Section III presents the construction of
the polar coding based OTP chaining structure and discusses its performance and remaining
problems. Section IV presents the construction of strong security polar coding scheme with the
modified multi-block chaining structure and then analyzes its performance theoretically. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
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II. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
Notation: We define the integer interval [[a, b]] as the integer set between bac and dbe. For
n ∈ N, define N , 2n. Denote X , Y , Z,... random variables (RVs) taking values in alphabets
X , Y , Z ,... and the sample values of these RVs are denoted by x, y, z,... respectively. Then pXY
denotes the joint probability of X and Y , and pX , pY denotes the marginal probabilities. Also
we denote a N size vector XN , (X1, X2, ..., XN), denote Xa:b , (Xa, Xa+1, ..., Xb). And for
any index set A j [[1, N ]], we define XA , {Xi}i∈A. For the polar codes, we denote GN the
generator matrix , R the bit reverse matrix, F =
[
1 0
1 1
]
, ⊗ the Kronecker product, and have
GN = RF
⊗n.
First we introduce the delay CSI assumption and its corresponding communication model.
Basically we intent to consider the security issue of a realistic situation that two legitimate users
are communicating over a known and stable main channel while an eavesdropper is wiretapping
through an unpredictable wiretap channel with varying channel states over the blocks. Luckily
for legitimate parties, the actual wiretap channel state can be causally obtained after every block
communication. For this delay CSI case, the system model is defined as follow.
Definition 1 The system model of delay CSI assumption is defined as (X ,Y ,Z,S, pY |X). X is
the input alphabet of main channel. Y is the output alphabet of main channel. Z is the output
alphabet of the varying wiretap channel. S = {s1, s2, ...} is the set of potential wiretap channel
states (uncertainty set). For each value si ∈ S, have si = p(i)Z|X which represents a potential
transition probability of wiretap channel. pY |X is the transition probability of main channel. For
main channel and all potential wiretap channels, they are symmetric but with no necessarily
degraded relations. For each N -length channel blocks, the wiretap channel state S is chosen
by the eavesdropper from S with a realization s and then remains constant during the block
communication. For
(
xN , yN , zN
) ∈ XN × YN ×ZN , have
pY N |XN
(
yN |xN) = N∏
j=1
pY |X (yj|xj)
p
(i)
ZN |XN
(
zN |xN) = N∏
j=1
p
(i)
Z|X (zj|xj) .
(2)
For legitimate parties, they can know the precise CSI only after each block communication.
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Fig. 1. The communication model of delay CSI assumption.
The communication process of the system model for t-th channel block is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Specifically as
• Eavesdropper Eve chooses the CSI St form S with realization st = si and then obtains ZNst
from her chosen wiretap channel with p(i)
ZN |XN .
• Legitimate transmitter Alice encodes the message M into XN and transmits it to Bob over
the main channel with pY N |XN , but she does not know the actual CSI st for the wiretap
channel only until the end of t-th block communication.
• Legitimate receiver Bob receives the main channel outputs Y N and decodes it into Mˆ . He
also does not know the actual CSI st for the wiretap channel only until the end of t-th
block communciation.
Definition 2 (Performance) For the communication model with a CSI value si ∈ S, define a
corresponding (2NR, N) code ci ∈ C, C = {c1, c2, ...}, then the performance of a code ci is
measured by
• error probability:
Pe(si, ci) = Pr(M 6= M̂) (3)
• information leakage to Eve:
L(si, ci) = I(Z
N
si
;M) (4)
Definition 3 (Criterions) For state si, rate R is achievable if sequence of code ci exists under
the criterions listed below:
• reliability criterion:
lim
N→∞
Pe(si, ci) = 0 (5)
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• weak security criterion:
lim
N→∞
1
N
L(si, ci) = 0 (6)
• strong security criterion:
lim
N→∞
L(si, ci) = 0 (7)
Note that reliability can be achieved with a vanishing error probability of decoding the
messages. Weak security can be achieved with a vanishing information leakage rate. And strong
security can be achieved with a vanishing information leakage.
Now we discuss the secrecy capacity of the delay CSI assumption under the reliability and
strong security criterions. Considering the simplified compound wiretap channel model with CSI
uncertainty set S, we first discuss the characterization of the secrecy capacities for the no CSI
case and the perfect CSI case.
Let Cs−noCSI(S) be the secrecy capacity over S for no CSI case. The bound of this secrecy
capacity with no CSI has already been summarized in [13] that for its lower bound, have
Cs−noCSI(S) ≥ max
M→U→X→Y,Z
[
I(U ;Y )−max
si∈S
I(U ;Zsi)
]
, (8)
and for its upper bound, have
Cs−noCSI(S) ≤ min
si∈S
max
M→U→X→Y,Z
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Zsi)] . (9)
Let Cs−perfectCSI(S) be the secrecy capacity over S for perfect CSI case. In this case, the
actual CSI is instantly known by the legitimate parties, thus the system model turns into the
basic wiretap channel model. Then according to the capacity result in [20], for every CSI value
si ∈ S, have
Cs−perfectCSI(si) = max
M→U→X→Y,Z
[I (U ;Y )− I (U ;Zsi |si)] , (10)
and over the set S, have
Cs−perfectCSI(S) = max
M→U→X→Y,Z
[I (U ;Y )− I (U ;Z|S)] . (11)
Then let Cs−delayCSI(S) be the secrecy capacity over S for delay CSI case. Comparing with
the no CSI case, delay CSI case is less pessimistic since the CSI of past blocks is accurately
known. But comparing with the perfect CSI case, delay CSI case is less optimistic since the CSI
of current channel block is unknown. Thus the secrecy capacity of this middle ground delay CSI
case satisfies
Cs−noCSI(S) ≤ Cs−delayCSI(S) ≤ Cs−perfectCSI(S). (12)
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For perfect CSI cases with asymmetric channels, secrecy capacity achieving polar codes can be
constructed by applying the mature technique of source polarization [21], [22] since which can
generate the optimally distributed channel input for achieving the asymmetric secrecy capacity.
However in delay CSI cases, this asymmetric coding technique is hard to apply, because without
the CSI realization of asymmetric wiretap channel, it is almost impossible to know the optimal
distribution for achieving the asymmetric secrecy capacity. Therefore in this paper, we only
study the secrecy capacity achieving problem of symmetric channel case under the delay CSI
assumption.
III. POLAR CODING BASED ONE TIME PAD CHAINING STRUCTURE
In this section, we are going to combine the OTP chaining method presented in [19] with the
polar codes to construct a polar coding based OTP chaining structure for the system model of
delay CSI assumption.
Note that in the proposed system model of delay CSI assumption, the main channel and the
wiretap channels of all the potential CSIs are set symmetric. Thus for any si ∈ S, we assume
that the legitimate parties know the optimal distribution of channel input XN to achieve the
symmetric secrecy capacity in (10) without having the actual CSI realization, and these secrecy
capacities are all positive under the perfect CSI assumption.
A. Polarized Subsets Division
First we present the channel polarization for both main channel and all potential wiretap
channels.
Definition 4 (Bhattaharyya parameter) Consider a pair of random variables (X, Y ) ∼ pXY ,
where X is a binary random variable and Y is a finite-alphabet random variable. To measure
the amount of randomness in X given Y , the Bhattaharyya parameter is defined as
Z(X|Y ) = 2
∑
y∈Y
pY (y)
√
pX|Y (0|y)pX|Y (1|y). (13)
According to the channel polarization theory in [2] for β ∈ (0, 1/2), δN = 2−Nβ , have
• polarization of main channel with the known and fixed transition probability pY |X :
HX|Y =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U1:j−1, Y N) ≥ 1− δN}
LX|Y =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U1:j−1, Y N) ≤ δN} , (15)
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• polarization of the wiretap channel for every potential CSI value si = p
(i)
Z|X , si ∈ S:
H(i)X|Z =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U1:j−1, ZN) ≥ 1− δN}
L(i)X|Z =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U1:j−1, ZN) ≤ δN} . (17)
Note that for legitimate parties, they know the fixed transition probability pY |X of the main
channel for entire multi-block communication, thus they can directly have the polarization result
of main channel from the beginning. But they do not know the polarization result of current
wiretap channel only until the end of current block communication. For eavesdropper Eve, she
knows all the polarization results of main channel and wiretap channel at the beginning of the
communication.
Then based on the above channel polarization results, for each potential CSI value si = p
(i)
Z|X ,
si ∈ S, we can have the polar subsets division of the channel block index [[1, N ]] as follow.
I(i) = LX|Y ∩H(i)X|Z
F (i) = (LX|Y )c ∩H(i)X|Z
R(i) = LX|Y ∩
(
H(i)X|Z
)c
B(i) = (LX|Y )c ∩ (H(i)X|Z)c .
(19)
Note that for each si = p
(i)
Z|X , subset I(i) is secure and reliable; subset F (i) is secure but
unreliable; subset R(i) is reliable but insecure; subset B(i) is neither secure nor reliable. Also
note that in the communication model, no matter how si = p
(i)
Z|X is varying, subset reliable for
Bob is fixed to LX|Y , subset unreliable for Bob is fixed to
(LX|Y )c. Moreover, for any si ∈ S,
have
I(i) ∪R(i) = LX|Y
F (i) ∪ B(i) = (LX|Y )c
lim
N→∞
1
N
|I(i) ∪R(i)| = I(U ;Y )
lim
N→∞
1
N
|F (i) ∪ B(i)| = I(U ;Zsi).
(21)
Also note that for degraded wiretap channel cases [4], have
lim
N→∞
1
N
|I(i)| = lim
N→∞
1
N
|LX|Y ∩H(i)X|Z |
= I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Zsi)
= Cs−perfectCSI(si),
(23)
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and
lim
N→∞
1
N
|B(i)| = lim
N→∞
1
N
| (LX|Y )c ∩ (H(i)X|Z)c | = 0. (24)
B. Polar Coding Based OTP Chaining Structure
On the basis of the polar subsets division in (19), we now construct the polar coding based
OTP chaining structure for the delay CSI case.
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Fig. 2. The polar coding based OTP chaining structure.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the entire communication of the OTP chaining structure contains
T + 1 times N -length block communication from time 0 to time T . For time t ∈ [[0, T ]] with
the CSI realization st, the actual division of polarized subsets is denoted as (It,Rt,Bt,Ft). For
legitimate parties, since they do not have the CSI realization of the current wiretap channel at
the point of encoding and decoding, they can only guarantee the reliability of the transmitted
information by the fixed reliable polarized subset LX|Y of the main channel. But every time
when the current block communication is complete, they can accurately have the CSI realization
st and then obtain the polarized subsets (It,Rt,Bt,Ft). Therefore they can identify the bits that
have just been reliably and securely transmitted, as the part in It, and also the bits that have
just been reliably but insecurely transmitted, as the part in Rt.
Then according to the idea of the OTP chaining method in [19], since bits in It have been
securely transmitted, they can be used as the key stream to one-time-pad the message Mt+1 for
(t + 1)-th time block communication by the legitimate transmitter; also since bits in It have
been reliably transmitted, the key stream can be correctly decoded by the legitimate receiver and
then used to decrypt the received message in (t+ 1)-th time block communication.
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It seems that the polarized subset division of polar codes can well match the idea of the OTP
chaining structure in [19] to provide a secure communication. Unfortunately, there are still flaws
for this combined structure. In the non-degraded delay CSI case, since the realization of CSI
can only be obtained by the legitimate parties after each block communication, the unreliable
and insecure subset B of the current block can not be identified from the unreliable subset(LX|Y )c at the time of encoding. Thus for reliability consideration, as a preliminary solution
for the structure, subset B is assigned with the publicly known frozen bits together with the
original frozen subset F . However, this preliminary solution may compromise the security in
non-degraded cases, which will be emphatically discussed in the following sections.
Now we present the construction of the polar coding based OTP chaining structure that is
illustrated in Fig. 2. Note that polarized subsets (HX|Y ,LX|Y ) remain constant during the entire
(T +1) times communicaiton. Denote UNt the U
N of t-th time block transmission, then for any
t ∈ [[1, T ]], have It−1 ⊆ LX|Y , so subset It−1 is reliable for both UNt−1 and UNt .
Block communication of time 0:
• Legitimate parties obtain the polarized subsets of the known and fixed main channel as
LX|Y and
(LX|Y )c;
• Assigning the uN0 for polar coding:
– uniformly distributed random bits are assigned to the reliable subset LX|Y , also as
I0 ∪R0;
– publicly known frozen bits are assigned to the unreliable subset
(LX|Y )c, also as B0∪F0;
• Alice encodes uN0 into the channel input x
N
0 by polar encoding x
N
0 = u
N
0 GN , and then
transmits xN0 to Bob over the main channel block;
• Bob receives yN0 from the main channel block and then decodes it into the estimated uˆ
N
0
by using the succussive cancelation (SC) decoding [2]:
uˆj =

arg max
u∈{0,1}
pUj |U1:j−1Y N
(
u|uˆ1:j−1yN) , if j ∈ LX|Y
publicly known frozen bit, if j ∈ (LX|Y )c ; (25)
• After the block communication, both Alice and Bob obtain the CSI of time 0 as the S0
with realization s0 and subset I0. Then Alice extracts uI00 as the key stream for next block’s
encryption and Bob extracts uˆI00 as the key stream for next block’s decryption.
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Block communication of time t, t ∈ [[1, T ]]:
• Legitimate parties obtain the divided subsets of last block as (It−1,Rt−1,Bt−1,Ft−1);
• Assume a binary message Mt that satisfies |Mt| = |It−1|. Then encrypt |Mt| into ciphertext
Et by Et =Mt ⊕ uIt−1t−1 , where ⊕ is the XOR operation;
• Assigning the uNt for polar coding:
– ciphertext Et is assigned to subset It−1;
– uniformly distributed random bits are assigned to subset Rt−1;
– publicly known frozen bits are assigned to subset
(LX|Y )c;
• Alice encodes uNt into the optimally distributed channel input x
N
t by polar encoding x
N
t =
uNt GN , then transmits x
N
t to Bob over the main channel block;
• Bob receives yNt from the main channel block and decodes it into the estimated uˆ
N
t by
using the SC decoding:
uˆj =

arg max
u∈{0,1}
pUj |U1:j−1Y N
(
u|uˆ1:j−1yN) , if j ∈ LX|Y
publicly known frozen bit, if j ∈ (LX|Y )c ; (26)
• Bob extracts uˆIt−1t as the ciphertext and decrypts it by M̂t = uˆ
It−1
t ⊕ uˆIt−1t−1 ;
• After the block communication, both Alice and Bob obtain the CSI of time t as the St
with realization st and subset It. Then Alice extracts uItt as the key stream for next block’s
encryption and Bob extracts uˆItt as the key stream for next block’s decryption.
C. Performance Discussion
Now we analyze the performance of the polar coding based OTP chaining structure and discuss
its existing problems.
In the structure, ciphertext is carried by UIt−1t , and key stream is carried by U
It
t , thus the
reliability of the secure polar coding scheme is measured by the error probability of decoding
the ciphertext and key stream from time 0 to time t.
Lemma 1 ( [2]) Considering an arbitrary subset A of block index [[1, N ]] for DMC W , in case
of A used as the information set and Ac used as frozen set for polar coding with
A ⊆ {j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U1:j−1, Y N) ≤ δN} , (27)
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then for the successive cancellation decoding, β ∈ (0, 1/2), δN = 2−Nβ , the block error
probability is bounded by
Pe(A) ≤
∑
j∈A
Z(Uj|U1:j−1, Y N) = O(2−Nβ). (28)
Proposition 1 For the communication model of delay CSI assumption, reliability can be achieved
by the proposed polar coding based OTP chaining structure with setting B as frozen bit set.
Proof: In the entire T + 1 times block communication, there are T times ciphertext trans-
missions from time 1 to time T , and T times key stream transmissions from time 0 to time T −1.
Let Pe(T +1) be the decoding error probability of Bob for both ciphertext and key stream, have
Pe(T + 1) =
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈It−1
Z(Uj|U1:j−1, Y N) +
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j∈It
Z(Uj|U1:j−1, Y N)
(a)
≤TO(2−Nβ) + TO(2−Nβ)
=2TO(2−N
β
),
(30)
where (a) is due to Lemma 1 and (It, It−1) ⊆ LX|Y . Therefore the reliability can be achieved
with a fixed T .
Next we discuss the security of the polar coding based encrypted chaining structure under the
reliability criterion.
Lemma 2 Considering a single block transmission with polar subset division in (19) that
(UI , UF , UB, UR) → XN → ZN , in case that Eve have received ZN and knows UI , UF
and UB, then for β ∈ (0, 1/2), δN = 2−Nβ , have
H(UR|ZN , UI) ≤ H(δN) + |R|δN (31)
Proof: Define ÛR = Fsc(ZN , UI) the SC decoding for Eve. SinceR ⊆ LX|Z , from Lemma 1,
have
Pe(Eve) = Pr(UR 6= ÛR) ≤ O(2−Nβ) (32)
Thus by applying the Fano’s inequality, have
H(UR|ZN , UI) ≤ H(Pe(Eve)) + |R|Pe(Eve)
= H(δN) + |R|δN
(34)
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Note that in the structure, message are encrypted by one time pad, thus the security can be
measured by the information leakage of the key streams which are carried by UItt . Let Lt be the
information leakage of block t, then have Lt = I(UItt ;ZNt ). Since for the entire T + 1 blocks
the transmission of key streams are independent between each blocks, the overall information
leakage of key streams is
∑T−1
t=0 Lt.
Proposition 2 For the communication model of delay CSI assumption, the proposed polar coding
based OTP chaining structure can only achieve the weak security under the degraded wiretap
channel cases.
Proof: To simplify the expression, we omit most of the subscript t in the following discussion.
Note that in the structure, in order to maintain the reliability, subsets UF and UB are set for
the publicly known frozen bits together. Therefore Eve can have the UF∪B when she decodes the
wiretapped message. Thus for the single block information leakage Lt, have
Lt =I(U
I ;ZN)
(a)
= I(UI , UF∪B;ZN)
=I(UI∪F∪R∪B;ZN)− I(UR;ZN |UI∪F∪B)
=I(UN ;ZN)− I(UR;ZN |UI)
=I(UN ;ZN)−H(UR) +H(UR|ZN , UI)
(b)
≤N
[
I(U ;Z)− 1
N
|R|
]
+H(δN) + |R|δN ,
(36)
where (a) is because UF∪B is the publicly known frozen bits, (b) is due to Lemma 2 and UR
are uniformly distributed random bits. From (21), have
lim
N→∞
[
I(U ;Z)− 1
N
|R|
]
= lim
N→∞
[
I(U ;Z)− 1
N
|R ∪ B|+ 1
N
|B|
]
= I(U ;Z)− I(U ;Z) + lim
N→∞
1
N
|B|
= lim
N→∞
1
N
|B|.
(38)
Thus we have
lim
N→∞
Lt ≤ lim
N→∞
|B| and lim
N→∞
Lt
N
≤ lim
N→∞
|B|
N
. (39)
In non-degraded cases, since neither |B| nor |B|/N is vanishing when N →∞, the security
criterions cannot be achieved for the communication of either the single block or the entire T+1
blocks.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 14
But in degraded wiretap channel cases, form (24) we can have limN→∞ Lt/N = 0, which
implies that the weak security can be achieved in this cases.
Since we have proven the weak security of the polar coding based OTP chaining structure in
the degraded delay CSI case, we briefly analyse its achievable secrecy rate.
Proposition 3 In degraded delay CSI case, the secrecy rate of the polar coding based OTP
chaining structure can almost achieve the secrecy capacity of perfect CSI assumption for the
entire T + 1 times block communication.
Proof: Let Rs(T + 1) be the secrecy rate of entire T + 1 time block communication. Since
in t-th block communication encrypted messages are transmitted in the subset It−1, we have
lim
N→∞
Rs(T + 1) = lim
N→∞
1
N(T + 1)
T∑
t=1
|It−1|
=
1
T + 1
T−1∑
t=0
lim
N→∞
|It|
N
(a)
=
1
T + 1
T−1∑
t=0
Cs−perfectCSI(St),
(41)
where (a) is due to (23) of degraded wiretap channel cases. Thus the secrecy rate can almost
achieve the average secrecy capacity of perfect CSI assumption.
In the next section, we will abandon the preliminary solution of assigning the subset B with
publicly known frozen bits, and explore a new solution to solve the remaining strong security
problem of non-degraded cases under the delay CSI assumption.
IV. SECURE POLAR CODING FOR STRONG SECURITY
As discussed in the previous section, for the communication model of non-degraded delay CSI
assumption, the constructed polar coding based encrypted chaining structure can not achieve the
security under the reliability criterion, due to the existence of the neither secure nor reliable
subset Bt. Thus in this section, we present a new solution for this remaining problem and
construct a modified secure polar coding scheme which can achieve strong security and reliability
simultaneously.
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A. Further Discussions on Strong Security
In our preliminary solution for subset Bt with the delay CSI assumption, UBtt is assigned with
publicly known frozen bits for achieving the reliability, which however has already been proven
for compromising the security.
For the non-degraded wiretap channel with the perfect CSI assumption, this conflict between
reliability and security has already been solved by the technique of polar code based multi-block
chaining structure proposed in [4]. The basic idea of this strong security solution is to convey
the bits of UB to legitimate receiver Bob separately while keeping it safe from the eavesdropper
Eve. Then in the multi-block chaining structure, for any block t, a reliable and secure subset Et
that satisfies |Et| = |Bt+1| is separated from the subset It. Then Et is set for carrying uniformly
distributed random bits which will be used for assigning the subset Bt+1 in block t + 1. Thus
when decoding, Bob can directly decode the bits in subset Bt+1 by the decoded random bits of
Et from block t.
However under the delay CSI assumption, this multi-block chaining structure cannot be directly
applied. According to the delay CSI assumption, the subset Bt+1 cannot be identified by the
legitimate parties only until (t+1)-th block communication is complete. Thus without knowing
the subset Bt+1, the corresponding subset Et in t-th block communication cannot be constructed.
Also the subset Bt can not be assigned independently from Ft.
Therefore, to achieve both strong security and reliability, we have to find a feasible solution for
this unidentifiable problem of Bt under the delay CSI assumption. Note that in the constructed
system model of delay CSI assumption, although subset Bt can not be identified when encoding,
subset
(LX|Y )c is known and fixed for any si ∈ S. Thus if we could conveying random bits for
the known and fixed
(LX|Y )c, then we can get around the unidentifiable problem of Bt since
Bt ⊆
(LX|Y )c.
The basic method for carrying out this alternative idea is applying the multi-block chaining
structure directly on the subset
(LX|Y )c. However, although this basic method may be able to
achieve both the reliability and strong security, it will also cause unacceptable secrecy rate
sacrifice. Considering the
(LX|Y )c based multi-block chaining structure, for block t, construct a
subset Et from It that satisfies |Et| = |
(LX|Y )c |. Then for the achievable secrecy rate of block
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t, have
lim
N→∞
Rs = lim
N→∞
1
N
|I \ E|
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(|I ∪ R| − |B ∪ R| − |F|)
= I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)− RF
= Cs − RF ,
(43)
where Cs is the secrecy capacity of a single block, RF is the rate of subset F . Thus as shown in
(43), part of the secrecy capacity is sacrificed if directly apply the multi-block chaining structure
on the subset
(LX|Y )c.
B. Modified Multi-block Chaining Structure
As we discussed in the last subsection, to achieve the strong security and reliability in delay
CSI case, we have to find a method to convey random bits for the known and fixed
(LX|Y )c
without unacceptable rate sacrifice. Thus on this target, we present a new solution called modified
multi-block chaining structure.
Note that in the alternative idea, subset
(LX|Y )c is going to transmit random bits instead of
the publicly known frozen bits of the preliminary solution. Since F ⊆ HX|Z , random bits in F
can be secure from eavesdropper Eve. Also in the delay CSI case, the realization of CSI can
be obtained by the legitimate parties after every block communication, by then they can have
the actual subset F and B for knowing which part of the random bits in HX|Z is secure in the
just completed block communication. Based on this point, we use the subset F to construct a
modified multi-block chaining structure.
The modified structure is illustrated in Fig. 3. For every time legitimate parties obtain the CSI
realization of the just completed block communication, they can know the actual divided subsets
(I,R,B,F) by (19). For all the potential CSI value si ∈ S, we assume that |B(i)| < |I(i)|. Then
we divide the subset I into two parts B′ and I ′ that satisfies
B′ ⊂ I, |B′| = B and I ′ = I \ B′. (44)
At the beginning of time 0, set a secure pre-shared frozen bits between Alice and Bob for
assigning the
(LX|Y )c. Then random bits are assigned to LX|Y . When the block communication
of time 0 is completed, legitimate parties can obtain the CSI realization s0. Accordingly they
can identify the part of the pre-shared frozen bits that remains secure during the just completed
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Fig. 3. The modified multi-block chaining structure for delay CSI assumption.
transmission as the UF00 . Also they can identify the securely and reliably transmitted bit of LX|Y ,
as the UB
′
0
0 and U
I′0
0 for Alice, Û
B′0
0 and Û
I′0
0 for Bob.
Then for the block communication of time 1, since |F0| + |B′0| = |
(LX|Y )c |, Alice can use
the bits of UF00 and U
B′0
0 together to assign the U
(LX|Y )
c
1 . Since Bob already have the U
F0
0 and
Û
B′0
0 , he can directly use these bits to decode Û
(LX|Y )
c
1 .
After the block communication of time 1, legitimate parties can obtain the CSI realization s1.
Then Alice can identify the bits in
(LX|Y )c that remains secure as UF11 , and for Bob as ÛF11 .
Also they can identify the securely and reliably transmitted bit in LX|Y as the UB
′
1
1 and U
I′1
1 for
Alice, ÛB
′
1
1 and Û
I′1
1 for Bob. Then (U
F1
1 , U
B′1
1 ) and (Û
F1
1 , Û
B′1
1 ) can be used for the
(LX|Y )c in
the block communication of time 2.
Then the following blocks just repeat these operations. Therefore random bits of
(LX|Y )c can
be conveyed from Alice to Bob separately and securely over the blocks.
C. Strong Security Polar Coding Scheme
By combining the modified multi-block chaining structure with the OTP chaining structure,
we present the strong security polar coding scheme for the non-degraded communication model
of delay CSI assumption.
Block communication of time 0:
• Legitimate parties obtain the polarized subsets of main channel as LX|Y and
(LX|Y )c;
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• Assigning the uN0 for polar coding:
– uniformly distributed random bits are assigned to subset LX|Y ;
– pre-shared and secure frozen bits are assigned to subset
(LX|Y )c;
• Alice encodes uN0 into the optimally distributed channel input x
N
0 by polar encoding x
N
0 =
uN0 GN , and transmits x
N
0 to Bob over the known and fixed main channel block;
• Bob receives yN0 and decodes it into the estimated uˆ
N
0 by using the SC decoding:
uˆj =

arg max
u∈{0,1}
pUj |U1:j−1Y N
(
u|uˆ1:j−1yN) , if j ∈ LX|Y
pre-shared secure frozen bit, if j ∈ (LX|Y )c ; (45)
• After the block communication, with the delay CSI realization s0.
– Alice identifies uI
′
0
0 as the key stream for next block encryption, also identifies u
F0
0 and
u
B′0
0 as the random bits for assigning the u
(LX|Y )
c
1 in the next block;
– Bob identifies uˆI
′
0
0 from the decoded message as the key stream for next block decryp-
tion, also identifies uF00 and uˆ
B′0
0 as the random bits for decoding the u
(LX|Y )
c
1 in the
next block;
Block communication of time t, t ∈ [[1, T ]]:
• Legitimate parties obtain the divided subsets of last block as (I ′t−1,B′t−1,Rt−1,Bt−1,Ft−1)
by the CSI realization st−1;
• Assume a message Mt that satisfies |Mt| = |I ′t−1|. Then encrypt |Mt| into ciphertext Et by
Et =Mt ⊕ uI
′
t−1
t−1 ;
• Assigning the uNt for polar coding:
– ciphertext Et is assigned to subset I ′t−1;
– uniformly distributed random bits are assigned to subset Rt−1;
– random bits of uFt−1t−1 and u
B′t−1
t−1 are assigned to subset
(LX|Y )c;
• Alice encodes uNt into the optimally distributed channel input x
N
t by polar encoding x
N
t =
uNt GN , and transmit x
N
t to Bob over the main channel;
• Bob receives yNt and decodes it into the estimated uˆ
N
t by using the SC decoding:
uˆj =

arg max
u∈{0,1}
pUj |U1:j−1Y N
(
u|uˆ1:j−1yN) , if j ∈ LX|Y
corresponding bit in uˆFt−1t−1 and uˆ
B′t−1
t−1 , if j ∈
(LX|Y )c ; (46)
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• Bob extracts uˆ
I′t−1
t as the ciphertext and decrypts it by M̂t = uˆ
I′t−1
t ⊕ uˆI
′
t−1
t−1 ;
• After the block communication, with the delay CSI realization st.
– Alice identifies uI
′
t
t as the key stream for next block encryption, also identifies u
Ft
t and
u
B′t
t as the random bits for assigning the u
(LX|Y )
c
t+1 in the next block;
– Bob identifies uˆI
′
t
t from the decoded message as the key stream for next block decryp-
tion, also identifies uˆFtt and uˆ
B′t
t as the random bits for decoding the uˆ
(LX|Y )
c
t+1 in the
next block;
D. Performance Analysis
Now we analyze the performance of the proposed strong security polar coding scheme and
theoretically discuss its reliability, security and secrecy rate under the delay CSI assumption.
1) Reliability: reliability of the proposed strong security polar coding scheme is on the error
probability of decoding the ciphertext, key stream and the random bits of subset B′ from time
0 to time T .
Proposition 4 The reliability criterion can be achieved by the proposed strong security polar
coding scheme under the delay CSI assumption.
Proof: Similar as in Proposition 1, for the error probability of entire T + 1 times block
communication, have
Pe(T + 1) =
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈I′t−1
Z(Uj|U j−11 , Y N) +
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j∈I′t
Z(Uj|U j−11 , Y N)
+
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j∈B′t
Z(Uj|U j−11 , Y N)
=3TO(2−N
β
),
(48)
which proves the reliability.
2) Strong security: In the proposed strong security polar coding scheme, key streams are
carried by UI
′
t
t while ciphertexts are carried by U
I′t−1
t . Thus for the entire T + 1 times block
communication, the security can be measured by the overall information leakage of all the subset
I ′ from time 0 to time T .
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Definition 5 For arbitrary subset A of index [[1, N ]], define a1 < a2 < ... < a|A| the correspond-
ing indices of the elements UA, and
UA , Ua1:a|A| = Ua1 , Ua1 , ..., Ua|A| . (49)
Proposition 5 The strong security criterion can be achieved by the proposed strong security
polar coding scheme under the reliability criterion for delay CSI assumption.
Proof: For block t, denote It = U
I′t
t , Bt = U
B′t
t , Ft = U
Ft
t and Zt = ZNt . Then for the
entire T + 1 times block communication, the general information leakage is
L(T + 1) = I(I1:T ;Z1:T ). (50)
Now we perform a similar analysis operation as in [4] on the L(T + 1) for the modified
multi-block chaining structure. Let
IT = I(I
1:T ,BT ,FT ;Z
1:T ) ≥ L(T + 1), (51)
then for t ∈ [[1, T ]], have
It = I(I
1:t,Bt,Ft;Z
1:t)
= I(I1:t,Bt,Ft;Zt) + I(I
1:t,Bt,Ft;Z
1:t−1|Zt)
(a)
= I(It,Bt,Ft;Zt) + I(I
1:t,Bt,Ft;Z
1:t−1|Zt)
≤ I(It,Bt,Ft;Zt) + I(It,Bt−1:t,Ft−1:t,Zt;Z1:t−1)
(b)
= I(It,Bt,Ft;Zt) + I(I
1:t−1,Bt−1,Ft−1;Z1:t−1)
= I(It,Bt,Ft;Zt) + It−1,
(53)
where (a) is due to Markov chain
I1:t−1 → It,Bt,Ft → Zt, (54)
and (b) is due to Markov chain
It,Bt,Ft,Zt → I1:t−1,Bt−1,Ft−1 → Z1:t−1. (55)
Since Eve do not know the initially pre-shared frozen bits for
(LX|Y )c at time 0, have
L(T + 1) ≤ IT ≤
T∑
t=0
I(It,Bt,Ft;Zt). (56)
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Also because Rt are set for transmitting random bits, have
I(It,Bt,Ft;Zk) =I(U
I′t∪B′t∪Ft ;ZN)
=
|I′t∪B′t∪Ft|∑
i=1
I(Uai ;Z
N |Ua1:ai−1)
(a)
=
|I′t∪B′t∪Ft|∑
i=1
I(Uai ;U
a1:ai−1 , ZN)
(b)
≤O(N2−Nβ),
(58)
where (a) is because Uai are independent from each other; (b) is due to I ′t ∪ B′t ∪ Ft = HX|Z ,
Z(X|Y )2 ≤ H(X|Y ) and HX|Z =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U1:j−1, ZN) ≥ 1− δN}. Therefore, we
finally have
L(T + 1) ≤ (T + 1)O(N32−Nβ), (59)
which proves the strong security.
3) Secrecy rate: Now we discuss the achievable secrecy rate under the reliability and strong
security criterions.
Proposition 6 For the entire T + 1 times block communication with delay CSI assumption, the
achievable secrecy rate of our proposed strong security polar coding scheme can almost reach
the average secrecy capacity of the perfect CSI assumption under the reliability and strong
security criterions.
Proof: According to the proposed strong security polar coding scheme, ciphertext are carried
by U
I′t−1
t for t ∈ [[1, T ]], hence for the secrecy rate, have
Rs(T + 1) =
1
N(T + 1)
T∑
t=1
|I ′t−1|
=
1
N(T + 1)
T∑
t=1
(|It−1| − |B′t−1|)
=
1
T + 1
T∑
t=1
|It−1 ∪Rt−1| − |Bt−1 ∪Rt−1|
N
.
(61)
According to (21), have
lim
N→∞
|It−1 ∪Rt−1| − |Bt−1 ∪Rt−1|
N
= I(U ;Y )− I(U ;ZSt−1 |St−1)
= Cs−perfectCSI(St−1).
(63)
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Thus have
lim
N→∞
Rs(T + 1) =
1
T + 1
T∑
t=1
Cs−perfectCSI(St−1), (64)
and with a large enough T , we can have
lim
N→∞
Rs(T + 1) ≈ Cs−perfectCSI(S), (65)
where Cs−perfectCSI(S) is average secrecy capacity of the perfect CSI assumption over the set S.
Therefore under the delay CSI assumption, the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed strong
security polar coding scheme can almost reach the average secrecy capacity of the perfect CSI
assumption.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a communication model of delay CSI assumption on the
simplified compound wiretap channel. On this model, we intent to find an explicit physical layer
secure coding solution to achieve a secure and reliable communication.
First we have constructed a polar coding based OTP chaining structure. In order to achieve
the reliability, we have presented a preliminary solution for the unidentifiable problem of the
neither secure nor reliable subset B that we assign the subset HX ∩
(LX|Y )c with publicly
known frozen bits. However, with this preliminary solution, the proposed structure can only
achieve weak security in degraded delay CSI cases, but fail to achieve weak or strong security
in non-degraded delay CSI cases.
Therefore, in order to achieve both strong security and reliability in non-degraded delay
CSI cases, we have discussed the remaining problems for applying the multi-block chaining
structure, and presented an alternative solution of conveying random bits for the known and fixed(LX|Y )c instead of the unknown subset B. Based on this idea, we have presented a modified
multi-block chaining structure by using the secure subset F and subset B′ for conveying the
bits for
(LX|Y )c. Finally by combining this modified multi-block chaining structure with the
OTP chaining structure, we have constructed a strong security polar coding scheme which, as
theoretically proven, can almost achieve the average secrecy capacity of perfect CSI assumption
under the delay CSI assumption with both reliability and strong security.
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